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Abstract
Residential construction is notoriously unstable, but the single extreme
cycle of the interwar years is in strong contrast to the multiple short cycles
of the period following World War II. However, both patterns of variation may
be explained by basic supply-demand factors in the housing market, by variables
transmitting the impacts of fluctuations in other parts of the economy, and
by government programs aimed at keeping building activity high.
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A Half Century of Housing in the United States
Lack of stability in the housing market makes it the source of continual
controversy. As home building swings in periodic surges and setbacks, there
is always some new difficulty to be remedied. The resulting program changes
have so far gained at best only indifferent success. Those interested
mainly in price stability, the inflation fighters, want to put strict limits
on government spending and are often willing to sacrifice housing as well
as other programs to that end. In contrast, those interested in welfare
aspects want more and better housing for everybody and decry shortfalls of
any kind, whether they originate in recession or in restrictive policies.
The problems of the moment tend to dominate views of what causes residential
construction to behave as it does and what remedial policy should be.
Observers familiar only with the records of the period since World
War II tend to view fluctuations as temporary departures from a norm related
in some way to household formation and economic growth. These somewhat er-
ratic movements are often described as "cycles" or, alternatively, as move-
ments related to cyclical developments in the general economy; the latter
shift funds into or away from the mortgages needed to finance home purchases.
In the decline of 1973-75, for example, it is generally held that tight
money was the primary depressant, with high interest rates in competing uses
draining away the finances urgently needed for recovery in building. At a
second remove, inflation is said to be the cause of high interest rates and
hence the villain that has cut building activity low. Yet it may be shown
that the moderate inflation of the post World War II years through the 1960s
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offered firm support to real estate and housing markets. It lifted the
home buyer's income and eased his debt burden, and at the same time validated
that debt for the mortgage holder, ensuring its repayment or the recovery of
capital in the event of resale.
In longer perspective, these short-term explanations appear somewhat
superficial. No doubt they contain indications of valid influences in the
special circumstances of the occasion, but a more complete account must
also explain the other situations in which those influences were clearly
inoperative. Basic factors in the use and expansion of the housing stock
work their effects out slowly. The extreme durability of houses ensures
sustained availability even if new construction should for a time cease
entirely. The maximum levels of building in any single year are adequate
at best to increase the total stock available by only a small fraction of
the units already on hand. So the influences relating to the position of
stocks are persistent and tend to carry through the more volatile year-to-
year changes resulting from other factors.
From the policy point of view, any programs adopted should look toward
longer-term results and not just aim at dealing with some immediate crisis.
This implies analysis of all the causal influences over a period long enough
for their impacts to be fully worked out, and this in turn requires data con-
sistent in concept and substantially accurate over a long period of years.
Research was undertaken to develop such a data base and point out its impli-
cations for the current situation. An approach to these objectives is
described in the remainder of this paper.
1
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Cyclical and Other Factors in Home Building
The patterns of variation in housing starts depend on the character
of the general economic situation as well as on a complex of factors
specific to the building and utilization of the housing stock. Nowhere
is this better seen than in the contrasts between housing activity in the
interwar years and in the period since World War II. (See Chart 1.)
In both periods, the variation may be described as cyclical, but there is
otherwise little similarity in the patterns revealed.
The fluctuations from 1920-41 would be readily identified by everyone
as a major cycle. Following the end of World War I there was a rise to
the 1925 peak, and this was followed by eight years of decline and eight
years of advance from the 1933 troug i. The movements through each phase
were extraordinarily smooth and the implitude of these movements was extreme
—
a decline of almost 90 percent from the high as the building industry ground
to a halt in the great degression, followed by a tenfold recovery to a new
high in 1941. In the late 1930s, one could say, "Construction is the most
stable and yet the most widely fluctuating segment of the whole economy."
The elements of truth in this statement depended on time perspectives: in
the short run, there was little change from one period to the next, but in
the longer span of a half cycle, the variation was tremendous.
This kind of cycle may be regarded as a special inventory cycle made
extreme in amplitude and in duration by the inflexibility of the industry
and the durability of its products. , In this interwar period the cycle repre-
sented the operation of a market unimpeded in giving effect to its own internal
forces and reinforced by related movements in other economic sectors. In the
various phases of such a cycle there is a rush to correct any deficiency that

happens to develop, and production expands to a rate that cannot be sustained
by long-term needs. Then after a while production has to be cut back to
bring it into line with those needs and this cutback brings on the decline.
The decline in turn overcarries, a deficiency again develops, and a new cycle
gets under way. Thus, the housing cycle both reflected and made a contribu-
tion to the overall economic fluctuations of which it was a part.
The extreme nature of this cycle may be regarded as an outgrowth of
World War I. The greater the disturbance that sets the cycle in motion, the
greater the imbalances that have to be corrected in each stage. The wartime
conditions created backlogs of demar i for housing and accumulations of
financial assets to make that demanc effective. This led to excessive rates
of investment; the economy had to o\ srproduce to remedy the pre-existing
deficiency. The result was that in the course of time overproduction led
to market saturation. Then the decline set in, and during the downward
i e or the cy Le j xlat ntera tions of excessive stocks and falling
ouilding activity resulted c overcorrection on the downside. A major war
inevitably ereaces so gre^t a cistur' ance that the cycle must be long drawn
out and t\,d amplitude i lgs exaggerated.
It may be noccc it that the recovery to the early 1940s
shown on Chart is s ib itant illy greater than was indicated by the old
series of housing start-. This is pan matter of statistical revisions,
as will be explained in the next section. There were also two special
influences: First, then; were the beginnings of government intervention
in the housing market. In the 1920s, mortgages typically provided for cur-
rent interest payments and final full payment of principal after a fixed
term to maturity. Many home owners had hoped to make the repayment of
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principal easy by putting their savings in the stock market, often on minimal
margins. After the crash on 1929, these "savings" were gone, and there was
nothing to bail out the home owners who were in default. Foreclosures arose
to unprecedented highs. In that uncontrolled market, the years of prosperity
that had piled up housing stocks anc mortgage debt culminated in a situation
in which the excesses had to be worked off through years of depression.
As depression measures, the government set up the Federal Home Loan
Rank and the Home Owner's Loan Corpcration to minimize the displacement of
owners from their homes. Subsequently, other housing programs were enacted.
Slum clearance and public housing programs were designed to speed recovery.
Mortgage insurance was introduced t > encourage lenders to make long-term
loans on small houses at low rates >f interest. Under the Housing Act of
1937, tax exempt local authoritites rere given substantial powers in the
federal guaranty of their finances. The new style in mortgages put the
loans on the monthly repayment plan since the monthly payments were rela-
tively small on long-term loans, tht distinction between renting and owning
a home became somewhat blurred.
The sec md spec5 I influence on the pre-war recovery was the beginning
of World War II in Europe :9. Developments there led to expansion of
armaments production here, and thi^ spread through related industries, such
as steel, and to soaw extent affected building, especially in areas where
the contributions to i -covery were greatest.
ilven without the special influepnes, however, the recovery phase of
Paul F. Wendt, Housing Policy, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1963.
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the cycle was well under way and would in all probability have progressed
to new peaks. After the U.S. entered the war toward the end of 1941, the
upswing was interrupted because the demands of military procurement were
overriding. All construction not judged to be essential to the war effort
was banned. The building cycle war not dead, however. It was merely sup-
pressed for awhile. Recognition of this fact led some analysts to a correct
forecast of the building upswing ir the early post-war years, at a time
when some other analysts were projei ting a downward phase of the prewar
cycle. Newbury, for example, warne< against "mechanically repeating the
average or normal cycle" and stater1 -hat "it is not necessary to project the
building cycle in practical foreca ts beyond the current or prospective
half-cycle, nor is it wise to do si " (Business Forecasting , McGraw-Hill,
1952, p. 138}
Pre .; ':!- new to the years f lowing World War II, the picture looks
altogether different. After the i: ^diate post-war high was reached in
1950, there was little dist t trc d and nothing that could be described
as a major cycle thougl Lgnoi s the possibility that a great post-war
cycle has not yet gone s der assed phase. The fluctuations arc".r.
a more or less constant level not f. r from 1.5 million starts per year
were seemingly rather erratic.
Nevertheless, the cycle builders could find a great deal of consistency
in these fluctuations, speaking, for example, of "three housing booms" in
9
the 1950's. To illustrate further, the dotted lines on the chart show that
the movements conform fairly well to a fixed cycle of four and one-half
years duration, with the cyclical highs at an annual rate of 1.65 million
Miles, Colean, Quarterly Economic Report of the Mortgage Bankers Asso-
ciation, No. 4-59.
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starts and the lows at a rate of about 1.25 million starts. This range of
about 25 percent of the average cyclical peak is certainly a significant
degree of variation, but it has little of the economic impact of the 90
percent decline to the 1933 low.
From a more general analytical point of view, however, the validity
of such a short cycle may be questioned. Each of these movements resulted
from a variety of factors that could only in part be considered cyclical
in nature. Some were in the nature of disturbances, others reflected
general economic developments that reacted on housing, and government
intervention constantly sought to expand or sustain activity. Throughout,
real estate and construction activities were aided by the growth in the
economy and recurrently by international disturbances, though these at
other times had depressing effects. After the wartime backlog had been
worked off by the mid-1950' s, government support and the continued growth
of the economy tended to counteract downside cyclical forces and sustain
the level of building activity through the 1960's.
The upsurge to the 1950 peak was the usual strong cyclical response to
a postwar situation. It was strengthened by the baby boom of the late 1940's.
The ability of affluent families to relocate and the high population mobility
associated with the discharge of the armed forces were also important. Even
the Korean War contributed a little in the 1950' s. All through these early
postwar years, pegged interest rates facilitated mortgage financing.
The decline from this peak more, definitely reflected the impact of
the Korean War. Direct restrictions were imposed on some building, and
interest rates were freed in the Federal Reserve-^Treasury Accord of March
1951. Uncertainties concerning building materials supplies were created
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by other restricions, by wide price fluctuations, and by the steel strike
of 1952. A moderate tightening of money and the beginning of recession
extended the decline through 1953.
Throughout the Korean War period, portions of the bakclog of demand
persisted and were ready to support recovery. This came with the Housing
Act of 1954, enacted as part of government action to counteract the reces-
sion of 1953-54. The new legislation provided for a striking change in
financing terms. Down payments on FHA loans were reduced and maturities
were extended. VA mortgages were put on the easiest terms — no downpayment
and 25 to 30 years to maturity. The increase in new housing starts from
late 1953 to early 1955 was very largely accounted for by the increase in
govenrment-guaranteed mortgage loans.
By the end of 1955 the backlog had been pretty well eliminated as a
special factor, and housing starts began to taper off. Again, new dis-
turbances quickly imposed changes. The Suez Crisis and the Soviet invasion
of Hungary created new uncertainties in mid-1956. Monetary tightness
developed, driving short-term interest rates above long-term bond rates
for the first time since 1929. The decline in housing starts accelerated,
and the onset of the 1957-58 recession drove activity still lower.
At the low of the 1958 recession the government again came to the
rescue. This sharp recession was particularly disturbing because the
Sputnik revealed that the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in
rocketry, spurring efforts to stimulate the economy as well as make up the
military deficiency. The housing act of 1958, enacted in April, made
available $1 billion in long-term loans for the purchase of newly built
houses with no or very low down payments. This budgetary contribution was
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supplemented by a lowering of administrative standards for home ownership.
Buyers were attracted by the easy terms and were found creditworthy. A new
upswing developed, and starts made a smart recovery to mid-1959 before
beginning a gradual retreat that continued through 1960.
Although the decline to a new low in early 1961 was moderate, the Kennedy
Administration had just taken over and was eager to ensure recovery. Its
efforts initiated the period of activism referred to as the New Economics,
culminating in the tax cut of 1964, which boosted housing as well as business
investment activity. New housing legislation was passed in 1961 and 1962,
and administrative decisions in 1962 not only favored housing in general but
aimed at low-income housing and the end of racial discrimination. In 1950,
mortgages typically ran for 15 or 20 years; in 1963, terms of 30 years or
more could readily be obtained. The subsidies provided were partly direct,
such as rent supplements, and part indirect, through tax reductions or
financing advantages. For example, accelerated depreciation was improved
and this not only made possible recapturing the investment more quickly
but was attractive through helping to convert income into capital gains.
Another factor facilitated the recovery, namely the shift to apartment
building. It was based upon demands of growing numbers of youths without
close family ties and of elderly persons living on social security or other
pensions. From a beginning in 1959, the building of multifamily units took
over the burden of cyclical variation during the 1960s; they rose to over
35 percent of the total in 1964, dropped back to 30 percent in late 1966,
and soared to 45 percent in 1968.
The sharp setback in 1966 resulted from the Vietnam War and the "credit
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crunch" of that year. The buildup of military activity led to a strong
spurt of inventory accumulation on top of the necessary expansion of pro-
duction. The Fed, fearing the inflationary impact, held the money supply
almost stable for a half year and drove interest rates sharply higher. Funds
flowed into business channels, and mortgage lending was depressed. With
the minirecession of early 1967, policy was eased, and recovery in housing
accompanied the resumption of the general upswing.
The effects of fiscal and monetary policy have clearly been important
in the relatively short swings described as housing cycles in the period
since World War II. The actions taken, however, do not coincide with any-
thing inherent in the housing market itself. What this experience reveals is
a constant tendency to use fiscal or monetary measures to spur housing
whenever the economy begins to falter, and even on some occasions to prevent
the effects of competition in other sactors from hurting building activity
too much. Policy could not see the merit of making one industry responsible
for the whole task of stabilization and leaving its resources unemployed
when they could be doing useful work. Some analysts have interpreted this
as meaning that the housing cycle is contracyclical to the broader cycles
in the overall economy. However, the latter themselves are very irregular
and reflect a multitude of diverse causal elements, some of which are
merely disturbances.
For all these reasons, the appearance of a short housing cycle of about
four and one-half years' duration may be judged artificial. The periodicity
of disturbances is certainly coincidental. World War II resulted in so major
a housing depression that those years have to be excluded from the analysis.
The housing declines of 1951 -*-52 in the Korean period and of 1966 in the
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Vietnam period have some similar elements but are so limited in magnitude and
duration that they may well be attributed to noncyclical causes. There is
nothing in the processes of creating, financing, and using houses or in the
position of stocks relative to the demographic variables to suggest that the
observed patterns could arise from causation within this sector itself.
The basic question, therfore, is whether the major housing cycle, as
it was experienced in the inter-war years is dead, completely a thing of the
past. The experience of a half-century seemingly reveals two different
phenomena. It poses the question, Hov much have the causes changed?
Answering this question is the goal of the following analysis, but before
proceeding, some consideration must I e given to the suitability of the data
which are to be used.
Housing Starts, 1920-1970
During the 1950' s research on noising inventories and activity indi-
cated that the then existing series on housing starts was seriously in error.
The underestimating of starts had begin much earlier, and it mostly repre-
sented a cumulating bias. The main source of information in compiling the
estimates was the number of- building permits issued in permit-issuing
places. These estimates were too low because the process which has been
variously termed urban sprawl and suburban spread had put an increasing
proportion of homebuilding into unincorporated, non-permit-issuing areas.
The resulting underestimation was therefore progressive. However, since
the Bureau of the Census had been taking steps to analyze the deficiency
during the first postwar decade and had corrected the current estimates,
the remaining deficiency for the 1950' s showed a reverse progression. By
1960 the Bureau was ready with some revisions and with a new series for
\
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1959 and subsequent years.
In 1964, with the results of the 1960 Census available, an interpola-
tionformula was used to correct the starts data back to 1945. In percentage
terms, the adjustments rose from 11 percent in 1959 to 40 percent in 1950
to 46 percent in 1945. This major revision lifted the postwar peak year,
1950, from 1.4 million units to 1.95 million. Revisions were not, however,
carried back into the prewar years. This revision for 1945-59 was in effect
an inverted adjustment resulting from earlier improvements and revisions.
There were clear indications in the basic Census reports as well as
in the less well established data relating to other aspects of the situation
that the earlier accepted estimates of housing starts deviated in a pattern
that may be broadly characterized as follows: The degree of underestimate
was relatively small in the 1920' s; it accelerated sharply in percentage
rerms with the onset of the Depression; it reached a peak during the 1940' s,
when attention was centered on the more pressing problems related to World
War II; and improvements were effected after the War and especially during
the late 1950' s to reduce the discrepancy to something like negligible
proportions.
Establishing Decade Benchmarks. As a starting point in the present effort
to make the earlier data comparable with the new, the household data of the decen-
nial censuses were taken as basic benchmarks, with the breakdown into farm and
nonfarm being maintained over the entire period. From these data as basic points of
Dennis, S., "Revised Estimates of New Nonfarm Housing Units Started,
1945-1958", Construction Reports .
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reference, a corrected series of decade totals was derived in a two-way
approach that involved the reconciliation of changes in stock with compo-
nents of change. For this purpose past studies and existing data were
utilized as fully as possible. During the early decades, data are weakest,
so estimates of the components of change (construction, demolitions, conver-
sions, and farm shift) had to be revised and adjusted to force consistency
with changes in the stock of houses available (occupied and unoccupied,
farm and nonfarm) that were in part similarly adjusted. This cross checking
in terms of the inherent relationship between the changes computed from the
two data sets here provides the only assurance of accuracy possible in view
of the absence of firm source data.
The initial stage aimed at obtaining estimates for conterminous U.S.
from 1920 to 1960 on the old definition of farms. These estimates were then
adjusted to include Alaska and Hawaii by simple ratio procedures; the latter
do not take differential growth rate; into account but any errors they
introduce are negligible in the totals; and the starts data were blown up
by a monthly set of correction factors which would bring them to a level
comparable with the new series, including the revised data for 1945-1959.
The translation of household data to houses available required estimates
Of the number of vacant units. Unoccupied may be preferred to vacant because
in some contexts "vacancies" refer only to units available for sale or rent,
whereas seasonal, dilapidated, and units rented, sold, or held off the market
had to be included. The recent censuses provide stock figures that could
be used directly, subject only to some adjustments for such things as timing,
changes in definition, and in number of states. The backward projection of
the rates for various kinds of vacant units is shown in table 1. The rates
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in three of the four subclasses seem to follow fairly well established
trends; the last is based on Wickens' description of the housing shortage
2
in 1920. The net result is an overall rate rising from a low of 5 percent
in 1920 to a high of 9.4 percent in 1930, followed by subsequent fluctuations
within this range.
An extension of this process was necessary to obtain separate rates for
farm and nonfarm units. In years where data are available, they indicate
that the rural rates were always higher, and since the nonfarm units are
more numerous, the farm rates are always farther from the average. The
differentials became more extreme in I960, as a result of the strong postwar
movement toward urbanization. Since separate reporting of farm and nonfarm
vacancies was then discontinued with the change in definition of farms, the
estimates were made for comparative purposes, to judge the plausibility of
the results.
The stock figures obtained in tlis way are shown in Table 2 after
adjustments to include Alaska and Hawaii. The continuation of this table
under the heading "New Farm Definition" shows the most recently published
Census data. With the changes in number of farms and in nonfarm residences
over the years, with the greater mobility of the population, the industriali-
zation of rural areas, and opportunities for farmers to earn off-farm income,
the old distinctions became blurred. As a result, it became logical to
consider rural vacancies to be nonfarm units. Nevertheless, the new
definition of farms in terms of money values of output creates difficulties.
2
Wickens, David L. , Residential Real Estate, New York, National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1941.

-15-
Maintaining comparability over long periods of time is hardly possible, and
new problems will continually arise from changes in rates of inflation.
For the present study, any definitional adjustments for the periods
before World War II are indeterminate. The social and economic changes that
came later were only then beginning to appear, and trends were disturbed by
the Great Depression. Note that the farm housing stock was relatively stable
from 1920 to 1940, rising only 3 or 4 percent in each decade. A stable
definitional change would therefore produce only small decade differences in
the farm sector, which in turn is fractional in comparison with the nonfarm
sector.
Evaluating the componenets of change began with construction. The
procedure adopted for farm as well as nonfarm units was as far as possible
2a 3
similar to that used by Naigles for the 1930' s and Dennis for 1945-1959.
For the early 1940' s, the linkage to Dennis' estimate for 1945 was relied on,
since it could be assumed that the percentage error in 1940-45 would be
more or less symmetrical with that during 1945-49. (However, the first two
of these later years as well as the earlier war years were too seriously
disturbed to be included in the subsequent analysis.) For the 1920' s, the
4
estimate of 7,497,000 units made by Blank was taken as the basis for the
initial estimate. He indicated that no available estimate could "be demon-
strated to be clearly superior." This is correct, but the evidence on the
subsequent pattern of adjustment analysis in relation to the other components
2a
M. H. Naigles, "Housing and the Increase in Population", Monthly
Labor Review
, April, 1942, pp. 869-80.
,
0p cit.
, p. 14.
D. M. Blank, The Volume of Residential Construction , 1889-1950, Tech-
nical Paper 9, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 1954, p. 59.
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of change suggested it should be raised a little, by about 200,000 units,
or 2.6 percent, including the adjustment for Alaska and Hawaii. This has
to be allocated primarily to the closing years of the decade in order to
prevent a growing discrepancy with the Bureau of Labor Statistics series
in those years.
Estimates of nonfarm demolitions and other losses are also available
from earlier studies. Chawner's estimate of 700,000 units for the 1920' s
,
7 8
Naigles 397,000 for the 1930's , and Riley's 600,000 for the 1940's are
all rough estimates but appear to be usable without adjustment. They were
subject to careful review from both empirical and theoretical points of view
and stand up remarkably well. Demolitions were related to the stock of
houses and to the volume of new building activity, which typically requires
site clearance. On this basis, the estimates for all decades fall reasonably
in line. Although Riley's estimate for the 1940's is somewhat on the low
side in terms of the criteria for the other decades, this may be attributed
to wartime conditions and the postwar housing shortage.
In the last two decades, mobile homes have come to show substantial
effects on the overall housing picture. Costs of conventional housing units
have risen so sharply that the mobile home alone provides a reasonable alter-
native, especially to young and low-income families whose required location
is within a reasonable distance from a trailer park. So they can hardly be
This problem was recognized by Manuel Gottlieb in Estimates of Resi-
dential Building, United States, 1840-1939 , Technical Paper 17, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1964, p. 62.
L. J. Chawner, Construction Activity in the United States , 1915-37, (?)
Department of Commerce, 1938.
Op cit
.
,
p. 880.
H. E. Riley, "Change in the Nonfarm Housing Inventory, 1940-1950,"
(mimeo) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1952.
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left out of account in future analyses of the housing situation. Still,
the picture here remains murky because mobile homes have not been taken
seriously until the last few years. Thus, they are reported as dwelling units
only if they are occupied; they need not be demolished to be removed from
the stock, merely put aside for future occupancy. Hence, estimates of this
part of the housing stock have to be related to households, and the data
on production and shipment are of limited value.
The census of 1960 reported some 550,000 households in mobile homes.
The comparable figure for 1950 was 315,000. However, 1950 was a year of
housing shortage and great population mobility, so the number reported
probably included many units of less than standard quality for regular living.
Partial data from other sources suggest that the decade increase in fully
equipped units was close to 400,000, more than half again as many as the
difference between the 1960 and 1950 figures in the census report.
Estimates for earlier decades are guesstimates that take some account of
social and industrial conditions and are subject to the constraint that the
cummulatlve total must come to 550,000 units in 1960. The census reports
for 1970 give a clearer picture and also show the units classified as farm
dwelling places. The increase during the 1960's may therefore be calcu-
lated as the increment over 1960 (adjusted for timing) and also provides
a basis for splitting the over all increases between farm and nonfarm units.
Farm dwelling units also complicate the analysis in two other ways —
by making necessary estimates of population moving off the farms and by
changes in definition. The latter has already been discussed (p. 15).
The former reflects the long term trend toward urbanization which has produced
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an almost continuous shift of housing units from farm to nonfarm usage, thus
raising the nonfarm stock. This shift must be estimated from the farm data,
which are in many respects more sketchy than the nonfarm data. Construction,
demolitions, and mobile homes play a part in this process. Conversions
are assumed to occur entirely in the nonfarm sector. The methods for
estimating farm construction were as far as possible similar to those for
nonfarm construction. In this way, estimates for all decades except the 1920's
were obtained. The backward projection of these to 1920 were made in con-
junction with those for farm shift; although the latter could hardly be
considered accurate, they were nevertheless given considerable weight in
determinig final results, since the construction estimates also had to be
rather crude.
Farm demolitions were estimated by applying nonfarm rates to the
beginning stock and adding one- fourth of the available mobile farm homes.
Taking the same proportion of the beginning stock for farms as for nonfarm
demolitions itself gives higher average demolition rates, since the farm
stock was basically stable or declining and the nonfarm stock was advancing.
The increasing mobility of the population, with the flow toward urban areas
suggests that a still higher average rate of demolitions on farm houses is
appropriate. The use of mobile homes for farm houses does not directly
displace older, immobile units in other locations but increases the proba-
bility that such units were abandoned and removed from the housing stock.
The estimates of "Conversions and other" represent a kind of catch-all
to cover changes in the nonfarm stock that could not be otherwise estimated.
Like demolitions, conversions to other usage tend to be high in periods of
peacetime prosperity. The demand for space by new businesses rises, and full
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employment with rising incomes enables many families to abandon unsuitable
or makeshift quarters in favor of newly constructed units. For these reasons,
in the prosperity years from 1923 through 1929, conversions were assumed
to bear a similar relationship to the housing stock and to construction
activity as in the 1950's. However, there tends to be a counter movement
in out-of-scope units, including trailers. During depressions, households
set up in cabins, shacks, barns, garages, and other substandard shelters,
and the need for conversions dwindles for lack of other demands. This more
than offsets the removal of units by conversion, so that in the 1930' s,
the contribution of the conversions item was positive. During the 1940' s,
the situation was more complex, but the restriction of building during the
war led to similar expedients for utilizing shelter of a temporary character,
again including trailers.
On the whole, therefore, the overall movement in the conversion cate-
gory is somewhat inverse to new construction, and taking this into account
along with the indications from partial data in the studies cited, estimates
for the 1930' s and 1940' s were made. In contrast to the farm shift, which
made a strong reversal from the 1930' s to the 1940' s, conversions held to
much the same level until the beginning of the postwar building boom.
Any such effort to adjust the housing data back through 1920 obviously
involves a process of estimating that cannot be wholly justified. The author,
like others before him, must rest his case on the grounds that the procedures
described result in a set of data of' the right order of magnitude, signifi-
cantly better than the previously existing data, which are themselves
estimates whose accuracy is qualified.
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From Decade to Annual Estimates. The translation of the decade esti-
mates of componenets of change into corresponding annual series requires
the use. of interpolation procedures. For most of the components, some
kind of related data are available as the basis for reasonable estimates of
year to year changes. Even in the case of conversions and other, logical
patterns are available by applying principles similar to those governing
the behavior of the other components. The total of houses available is
derived by summing the components, and since these add up to the overall
changes derived from the data for the census years, the end points of each
decade coincide with the benchmarks already described.
The most important component of change is new construction, and for
this component the best interim data also are available in the previously
published Bureau of Labor Statistics annual series on nonfarm housing starts.
To bring this series into line with the new benchmark estimates, correction
factors were derived from the decade ratios of the new series to the old. These
correction factors were computed as a single continuous interpolation in the form
of a fourth degree parabola such that:
NFHS = (a + bt + ct" + dt + et )NFHS
a o
where the adjusted starts (NFHS ) are obtained from the original (NFHS )
by multiplying by the values of the curve calculated for corresponding years.
The curve was made (1) to coincide with the Dennis correction for 1945;
(2) to match the average ratios for the three periods 1920-29, 1930-39,
and 1940-44, the last being derived as the decade total less the already
adjusted data for the years 1945-49; and (3) to start out level at the beginning
9in 1920 . The correction factors and results are shown on Chart 2. It
will be noted that after the initial slow start, the curve is substantially
9
The methodology for this kind of interpolation is discussed in
V. Lewis Bassie, Economic Forecasting, McGraw-Hill, 1958, pp. 89-91 and
653-661.
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linear from 1925 to 1945. This method preserves most of the year-to-year
pattern of changes shown by the earlier BLS data. Those data were carefully
prepared and are of substantial validity in indicating short-term changes
that are best preserved as far as possible in the new series.
In absolute numbers, the present corrections were significantly large
mainly in the late 1930' s and early 1940' s. Numbers of starts in the depres-
sion trough and in the war years were very low, so that even large percen-
tage adjustments produced only small absolute changes. The results for
1942-46 are in any case of very little significance since the data for those
years have to be left out of the subsequent correlation analysis because of
the distorting effects of wartime controls.
Treating the annual starts data as construction completed by the April
census data is fully justified in years when apartment building is very
limited. It has some effect in shifting units into the years when apartment
completions
building starts are high because/of these larger projects average nine to
twelve months. However, the errors are small, being a fraction of a frac-
tion and in no year so much as 0.5 percent of the nonfarm stock. Subse-
quently, the discrepancy is further reduced when the April data are inter-
polated back to January; this final adjustment is of course completed
only after construction and the other components of change are combined to
obtained overall totals of changes in houses available as of April.
Annual estimates of demolitions were computed as a function of total
houses available at the beginning of the year in millions of units (HAVL)
and total annual construction in billions of constant dollars (TCD) . Some
See Dorothy K. Newman', "Estimating National Housing Volume", Tech-
niques of Preparing Major BLS Series , Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin
No. 993, 1950.
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losses occur as the result of natural causes, such as fires, floods, and
tornados; these relate primarily to the number of units in existence.
Others are brought about mainly in the clearing of sites for new construction,
whether rebuilding of blighted areas, expanding commercial and industrial
facilities, or opening corridors for new highways. The regression of demo-
2litions on HAVL and TCD gives a very good fit (R =.994), and the calculated
values were then further adjusted by interpolations making them conform
exactly to the decade averages. The results are shown in part A of Chart 3,
where the decade averages are portrayed as short horizontal lines. The
climb from the wartime low of 1945 to -he 1969 high of over 400,000 units
was almost uninterrupted.
The estimates of conversions and other are pure interpolations with
patterns of movement adjusted to the conditions prevailing in each decade.
In general, the net effect of conversions, mergers, and other causes,
known and unknown, tends to show movements inverse to those of new construc-
tion. Like demolitions, they impose maximum losses during periods of
high prosperity. Unlike demolitions, they make positive contributions to
available units when construction activity is restricted, as in depression
or war years. The estimates are shown in part B of Chart 3. Any inaccur-
acies in them are more likely to derive from the catch-all nature of the
decade estimates than from the smooth-. interim effects of the interpolation
curve; to the extent that the former are accurate, the latter are not likely
to Introduce substantial errors in the year-to-year totals of houses
available.
The interpolation of increases in mobile houses was based on shipments
data less losses calculated from service-life curves showing the percentages
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remaining year-by-year after the units were originally put into use. Prior
to 1959, shipments had to be estimated by projecting the industry growth
curve backwards. The average service lives were lengthened in stages from
10 years in 1949 and earlier to 15 years in 1965-69. The estimates obtained
by subtracting losses obtained fiom these curves from the estimated ship-
ments were then forced by a secondary interpolation into conformity with
the decade averages. The results are shown in part D of Chart 3. By 1969,
the contribution of mobile homes to the housing stock was clearly important.
All of the componenets so far discussed apply to the total stock as
well as to the farm and nonfarm subtotals. The reaminig component, farm
shift, affects only these subtotals, reducing the one and increasing the
other. The basic farm shift, excluding definitional changes, was calculated
as a proportion of farm households. The latter were obtained on an annual
basis from Historical Statistics and Current Population Reports, Series P-20
with corrections to put all years on the April basis and make them corres-
pond in decennial years with data on farm households in Table 2. The
proportion of farm households shifted were derived from a trend line fitted
to the decade estimates for the 1920' s and the 1960's. This line was modified
by a cyclical pattern covering two decades — the 1930' s, when the rate of
shifting was very low, and the 1940's, when it was very high. The 1950'
s
corresponded very clearly to the trend line except in the early years where
they had to be joined to the higher rates of shifting that prevailed in
the 1940' s. The results are presented in part C of Chart 3. The numbers
shifting year by year from 1945 onward show a moderate decline as the rising
proportion on the trend line are more than offset by the declining numbers
of" households to which those proportions are applied.
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These estimates of the basic farm shift had to be modified as a conse-
quence of the change in definition of farms. A change of this kind is
necessarily arbitrary as to timing. The fact that it was made effective in
1960 does not indicate that the changes underlying it were not significant
before 1950. On the contrary, it is almost certain that the war and the
postwar mobility were definite parts of the picture. The changes — totaling
1.5 million, made up of 948,000 households and 558,000 vacant units —
were therefore allocated over two decades on straight-line basis. Part C
of Chart 3 shows how the numbers shifting during the 1940' s and 1950' s were
raised by this procedure; the average annual shift of 75,300 amounted to
a little less than 0.2 percent of the average nonfarm housing stock during
this period but adds 60 percent to the shift already computed.
Summing the changes in all these components gives the changes in the
total nonfarm housing stock on an annual basis from 1920 to 1970. In the
first instance, these changes respcesent April dating to correspond to the
decennial censuses. The resulting nonfarm housing stock estimates were
then interpolated back to January :o give the beginning of year data desired
for further analysis.
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Factors Affecting Nonfarm Housing Starts
In analyzing residential construction activity over a half century, it
is necessary to take into account all the factors substantially affecting
housing starts during this period. A major point to be determined is whether
a single set of factors can explain both the major cycle of the interwar
years and the shorter term fluctuations of the post World War II period,
which also display some cyclical characteristics. For this purpose, the factors
may be classified in three groups:
1. basic cyclical factors internal to the housing cycle itself;
2. factors resulting from developments in other parts of the
economy that have substantial effects on the housing market;
and
3. indicators of government programs, which are semi-autonomous
in character though often enacted in recessions of construction
activity.
The basic cyclical forces may be effectively summarized in a stock-flow
equation that relates the stock of houses to the flows by which they are
created and used up. Houses are of course created by building. Losses
should be deducted to obtain net changes, but losses are, as already indicated,
functions of the housing stock and of building and. therefore may be omitted
rather than introduced as a separate variable. Houses are used up, or
consumed, by providing services over a long period of time. Such services are
provided to families, or to individuals living alone who form separate
The author has demonstrated the applicability of such equations not only to
housing but to other kinds of investment. See Economic Forecasting
, pp. 662-692.
Some additional aspects of the housing cycle are described in the author's
Uncertainty in Forecasting and" Policy Formation
, J. Anderson Fitzgerald Lecture
No. 1, University of Texas, Austin, 1959, pp. 25-30.
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households. Since the services are provided specifically to the occupants
of a dwelling unit throughout the year, the number of families or others
occupying the unit may stand as proxy for the services rendered. The cyclical
model may then be described by reference to the following diagram:
The Basic Housing Cycle
H = rF
By combining the two partial equations shown it may be seen that building
(representing the change in stocks) is a function of the beginning-of-year
stock and the number of families multiplied by a ratio r to indicate the
desired level of housing stock. Thus
B = a + bF-cH
-1
This equation states that construction is a positive function of the number
of families and a negative function of the stock of houses available at the
'
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beginning of the year. The equation relating F to B is more complex; it
involves income as well as investment and is dependent in pan: on demographic
factors. Nevertheless, building itself contributes with multiplier effect
to employment and to the number of families whose demand for housing is
effective in the market.
To represent the fa-nilies desiring housing, it is desirable to choose
a variable that is not directly affected by rates of building or by the
housing stock; the latter, for example would be true of the number of
households, in periods when demands f >r housing have risen sharply and therefore
run ahead of the supply. Hence, it ras decided to use a variable consisting
of married couples plus ona half of social security beneficiaries other than
married couples and children. The ..uthor's earlier s.udy, based mainly on
the interwar years usad married couples alone as such a variable. However,
this variable is clearly too narrow a measure in the period foLljwing World
War II. ^Ince the growth in other t>pes of families or households has been
very strong. Old age pensioners, sn igle individuals living alone, including
both divorced and never married, anc growing numbers of unmarried couples
living '"txjether have rendered the old family standards obsolete. Many of
these households which do not include both husband and wife are dependent upon
transfer payments. Others are not, but it is assumed that Social Security
beneficiaries can stand as proxy for the whole group. Taking half of the
beneficiaries with married couples gives a combined variable that is a relatively
constant proportion of total households in all the census years frojn 1920
to 1970; it ranges from a high of 88. 4, percent in 1920 to a low of 85.8 percent
in 1940.
The complete cyclical model shown in the diagram explains both the
interactions that give cumulative force to the fluctuation of construction
—
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both in recovery and in recession—and the controls on the amplitude of such
fluctuations—both at the peak and at the trough as excesses or deficiencies
in the stock of houses develop. The cycle must operate in a broader economic
environment and it is accordingly modified by developments in other sectors.
F and H , are important determining factors but they cannot stand alone.
As a measure of the shorter-term business investment cycles, unemployment
has several advantages. It reflects bcth the inventory cycle, which produces
the sharpest fluctuations, and the fixed capital cycle, which is of longer
duration than the inventory cycle but possibly of even greater influence
on employment levels over the intermediate term. Unemployment refers to
physical units and in this respect is more nearly on a par with houses and
families than are data in money terms, such as income or gross national
product. Finally, it only moderately correlated with the basic F and H.
variables in the housing cycle and therefore avoids to some extent the problem
of collinearity that would be introduced by another growth variable such as
total employment.
Financial stringency also hurts building activity from time to time.
Mortgage rates tend to be the most stable in the entire spectrum of interest
rates and therefore lose their attractiveness when money is tight. In contrast,
short-term rates are the most volatile and may rise above long-term rates in
periods when liquidity is low and loan demands are high; these periods are
likely to be characterized by cross currents of speculative and involuntary
inventory accumulation as well as by tight money as the Federal Reserve Board
fights inflation. For these reasons, the differences between short money
rates and long money rates are taken as a variable that indicates how building
may be affected by financial conditions. Specifically, the rate on 4 to 6
months commercial paper less the rate on Aaa bonds is a variable taken to
'
-
•'. i
.
!-. •
;S
-29-
measure the effects of competition in money and capital markets; these rates
are selected in part because they have been reported over the entire period
under consideration.
Housing is the one sector that is really subject to restriction by tight
money. The speculative elements in other business demands and the pressures
for capacity expansion in boom periods keep commercial and industrial activity
at peak rates despite high financing charges. Even the utilities are not
deterred because the higher costs get built into their rate structures and
are thus passed on to consumers. However, the government is reluctant to
let the residential construction carry the burden of restricting the boom,
and it constantly designs new programs to prevent extreme declines. These
have already been described.
It is difficult to quantify the affects of government action, but a rather
crude measure of the impact can be obtained by setting up a dummy variable.
Each time a new effort to stimulate building was undertaken a fixed amount is
assumed to be added and for reasons already stated these are assumed to be
cumulative. Thus, the dummy variable takes the value 0.0 when no new
government action has taken place, and it is lifted by 1.0 with each change
favorable to home ownership or rental by low-income families. The effects
appear to become effective most clearly in the year following the enactment
of legislation or stimulative administrative rulings. The following dates
for increases have been adopted with reference to the pages on which they
are discussed in parentheses: 1938 ( 5 ), 1950 ( 7 ), 1953 ( 8 ), and
1959 ( 8 ). This dummy variable progresses in steps from 0.0 in 1937 to
4.0 in 1959 and then remains stable through the decade of the 1960s.
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It may be pointed out that this procedure has some large judgmental and
rather arbitrary elements. This is not considered a major point as far as
the regression results are concerned. Because of the inter-correlation of
variables, the estimates are not greatly improved by this measure of government
programs, though by the usual tests the dummy variable is clearly significant.
What really matters is the degree of confidence one may have in the effectiveness
of the actions taken, and from this point of view its inclusion is fully
justified. This may be seen even more clearly in the data for the early
IQlQ's. The large subsidies provided in 1971-73 took housing starts to
new highs of about 2.5 million units; then after President Nixon cancelled out
the subsidies in January 1973, their removal contributed to the sharp decline
from the 1973 high to the 1974-75 recession low.
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Chart 4. The equation
for estimating nonfarm housing starts is (with t-values in parentheses)
:
NFHS = -.611 + .206 FDH - .157 HAVL + .311 GVAC - .079 UNEMP - .112(SM-LM)
(1.81) (6.23) (6.39) (5.98) (5.24) (2.28)
R
2
= .952 D - W - 1.72
These results are highly satisfactory in closeness of fit for a comparatively
erratic variable, and all the usual tests of significance are met. !
In a number of trials, the results are always consistent for the first
three independent variables (families desiring housing, houses available, and
government action); for them the signs of the coefficients never vary, and
the t-tests always show high significance. On the other two, unemployment and
money rates, there is greater variability in the t-tests and with some differences
in the data used, the sign of the money rate variable sometimes reverses. The
logic of including these variables is not wholly dependent upon the statistical
.'.:. • f:
!• .1
"j ":V
:
_.•»'
'
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results. The latter lend substantial support for it, but the analysis of
market relationships dictates that both should be included.
It should be noted that the correlation is somewhat better in the interwar
period than in the post World War II period. This results partly from the
fact that the standard error of estimate is larger in the later period and
partly from the smaller standard deviation of the data, which have been confined
to a narrower range of variation. Nevertheless, the peaks and valleys in
that period also are fairly well matched, coinciding in seven cases and
missing by only one year in the other three. Given the differences in under-
lying conditions, the stability of the relationships is indeed impressive.
Conclusion
The main conclusion of this analysis is that the basic relationships
have not changed through a half-century of experience in home building. The
same explanatory factors give reasonably good indications of the rate of
building to be expected. In the interwar years, when construction and Its
financing were mainly controlled by market forces alone, the cycle dominated,
and it produced an extreme range of fluctuation. It provides an illustration
of how gross investment can fall almost to zero in a depression where no
offsetting control measures are in effect. In the years since the end of
World War II, the picture is more erratic and at the same time better
controlled. This was a period of recurring disturbances and interventions,
some of them originating abroad, others at home. The fact that fluctuations
were held within a relatively narrow range around a stable level bespeaks the
success of measures more or less continuously aimed at preventing the kind
of developments portrayed in the earlier period.
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It may be inferred that housing will continue to perform in relation
to its own basic cyclical forces, to recessions and recoveries in other
important parts of the economy, and to the competition for available financial
resources. It will also seek and respond to government programs that affect
the population's ability to command separate accomodations. The 1948-1970
period represents in effect the finest hours of the mixed economy. The
disconcerting disturbances and the growing instability of the 1970' s presents
it with new challenges, and it remains to be seen if these can be successfully
met.
•-'-. :. .:
Table 1. Percent of Housing Units Not Occupied, 1920-1960
A. By Type of Vacancy
Total Seasonal Mlapida ted Rented, Sold
Held Off
Market
Available
1920* 5.0 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2
1930 9.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 5.0
1940 6.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.0
1950 6.9 2.4 1.2 1.7 1.6
1960 9.1 3.0 0.9 1.9 3.4
*Extrapolated backward by type and summed.
B. By Farm and Nonfarm
Total Farm Nonfarm
1920 5.0 6.0 4.6
1930 9.4 9.7 9.3
1940 6.6 7.0 6.5
1950 6.9 10.0 6.4
1960 9.1 11.0* 8.9*
*01d definition of farms.

Table 2. Stock of Dwelling Units U.S. Total, Census Years,
1920-1970 1 (thousands of units)
New Farm Definition
Total Nonfarm Farm
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
Total
Households
Unoccupied
Total
Households
Unoccupied
Total
Households
Unoccupied
Total
Households
Unoccupied
Total
Households
Unoccupied
25,
24,
1,
(
720
(
434
,286
33,
30,
3,
,114
,001
,113
37,
34.
2,
,441
,964
,477
46,
42.
3.
,137
,969
,168
58.
53,
5
,326
,024
,302
18,579
17,721
858
25,791
23,390
2,401
29,792
27,851
1,941
39,773
37,243
2,530
53,254
48,510
4,744
7,141
6,713
428
7,323
6,611
712
7,649
7,113
536
6,364
5,726
638
5,072
4,514
558
1960
1970
Total
Households
Unoccupied
Total
Households
Unoccupied
58,326
53,024
5,302
68,684
63,445
5,239
54,760
49,458
5,302
66,283
61,044
5,239
3,566
3,566
2,401
2,401
Data for all fifty states; ratio adjustments to include Alaska and Hawaii
were made for 1920, 1930, 1940, and 1950.
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Chart 2 Nonfarm Housing Starts, 1920-1969
orrection ratios, 1920- 1945
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